“ordinary [city] business.” At-large cats can scratch wood-work, defecate and urinate in gardens
and elsewhere, and carry disease that may be spread to both humans and other animals.
Contracting for a safe place to transport to and drop-off wayward, injured, abandoned or at-large
domestic animals, such as cats, in order to avoid or minimize such nuisances is therefore
ordinary city business.
In his lawsuit, Mr. Braun argues that the City “must adopt specific and express law as an
ordinance of the municipality in order to undertake the general grant of power provided by RSA
31.” He cites no case law or statutory authority for his position and he cannot. As discussed
above, not every action of the City must be by ordinance. The Board of Aldermen (or Finance
Committee) can and does act through a majority (or more) vote of the body. Voting to approve a
contract is a valid means to effectuate the “public business” of the city for the purposes of the
contract. In this instance, voting on a contract to fund shelter, pound, isolation and quarantine
services for the City, including for cats, is a legal purpose and a valid method to effectuate such
purpose. An ordinance is not required. Another example, the City contracts to install specialty
devices at the wastewater treatment plant. There is no ordinance that specifically states that
contracts can be entered into for such devices. The City can do so under its general contracting
power of RSA 31:3 and its ability to manage the prudential affairs of the city under RSA 41:8.
There are state laws regarding (or which could relate to) cats and the City’s authority to
legislate them. RSA Chapter 466 allows the City to license cats (but does not require it); see also
RSA 147:1, I which allows laws in regards to nuisances and RSA 47:17, I, XIV, which allows
laws to “carry into effect all powers by law vested in the City and “to abate and remove
nuisances.” Mr. Braun appears to argue that these statutes ‘preempt the field’ in regards to cats
and that, as they reference ordinances, the Board of Aldermen is only authorized to act through
ordinance, not by resolution or vote of the body to approve a contract. Again, Mr. Braun cites no
authority to support his position. Read in harmony with the Board of Aldermen’s ability to
manage the prudential affairs of the city, RSA 41:8, and the power to make any contracts “which
may be necessary and convenient for the transaction of the public business of the town,” RSA
31:3, those statutes do not preempt all City action in regards to cats. Neither do they require an
ordinance for the City to act in regards to cats.
Even if the Court disagrees that the Board of Aldermen does not have to have an
ordinance to contract with HSGN, the Board has enacted NRO 93-6. “Impoundment of dogs,
cats, ferrets and chickens found at large.” Section A of the ordinance relates only to dogs,
however the rest, sections B — F, specifically reference cats. Section A can be read in harmony
with NRO 93-2 forbidding certain animals to be at large. Cats are not on the list in 93-2, A.
That simply means that there is no penalty under NRO 1-9 regarding a cat being at large and
none was issued against Mr. Braun. An act does not have to result in a violation for the
impoundment of an animal as NRO 93-6, B — F delineate. Also while 93-6, A states that certain
at-large dogs “shall be” taken into custody, read as a whole 93-6 does not prohibit other at-large
animals from being taken into custody. The references to impoundment in sections B — F
necessarily and fairly imply the authority to seize an at-large dog, cat or ferret. It is impossible
to impound something that has not first been seized.
Mr. Braun’s constitutional claims are not pled in detail or well-formed and are, in any
event, equally without merit.
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